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GENERAL PERSONNEL
ISSUES
WILLIAM T. HOPKINS, ESQ.*
With respect to the employer-employee relationship in religious orga-
nizations, there are several laws that may be applicable to employees of
the church. I say may-it is rather interesting, you would expect that you
are either covered by the FLSA or you are not, you are either covered by
the Age Discrimination Employment Act or you are not-it sort of re-
minds me of the young priest who was traveling between parishes to say
mass on a Sunday morning. He was stopped for running a stop sign. He
went to court to present his position and he said, "Judge, I was coming to
the stop, I had my brake on, I slowed down to a snail's pace, I had enough
time to look both ways, it was totally clear. Yes, I rolled through the stop
sign but I was going so slow it was like I was stopped." The judge picked
up his gavel and said, "Young man, please come up to the bench." The
priest approached the bench and the judge started tapping on his head.
The judge said, "Tell me, do you want me to slow down, sir, or do you
want me to stop?"
The point is that you would expect either to be covered by these laws
or not. As we go through here, you are going to find out that you may be
covered or not depending on a lot of different factors contemplated by
each of the laws that I will refer to.
I would like to start with the National Labor Relations Act because
our firm handles a lot of NLRA issues. You are probably all well ac-
quainted with the case of National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago.' It is the leading case that everybody looks at to find
out whether your employees can legally form a union and require the
church to bargain with them as a group under the NLRA.
Now this case has a special significance to us because it came out of
the Fort Wayne/South Bend Diocese. Because it came out of our own
diocese we have something to finish this story off with that will probably
surprise some of you. The NLRB attempted to exercise jurisdiction over
the lay teachers at the South Bend schools. The Supreme Court decided
* Gallucci, Hopkins & Theisen.
440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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that the National Labor Relations Board could not exercise its jurisdic-
tion over lay teachers in parochial schools who are responsible for teach-
ing both religious and secular subjects. The Court reasoned that if the
NLRB were allowed to exercise such jurisdiction then serious First
Amendment problems could arise. Therefore, the Court ruled, it would
only approve the exercise of NLRB jurisdiction in the area where the ex-
ercise of that jurisdiction is based upon a clear showing of congressional
intent.
Because Congress did not go out and say lay teachers in parochial
schools are intended to be covered-under the NLRA, the Supreme Court
says we are not going to cover it. The distinction the Supreme Court drew
was that these lay teachers were responsible for teaching not only secular
but also religious matters. Now, subsequent to the Catholic Bishops deci-
sion, numerous cases have come down from the NLRB and the federal
court system regarding the exercise of NLRB jurisdiction under similar
circumstances. In 1987, in the Jewish Day School' decision, the NLRB
refused to extend its jurisdiction over lay school teachers who taught both
secular and non-secular subjects by deciding that it would not interject
itself into situations which may require the in-depth analysis of religious
factors. So the NLRB, believe it or not, took what the Supreme Court
said and broadened it. This is the first time in my 12 years of working in
front of the NLRB that I have seen them liberalize anything in favor of
employers.
The Supreme Court's decision dealt with religious employers of lay
teachers. The Jewish Day School decision is different from the Supreme
Court Catholic Bishops case because it applies to any school, whether
religiously owned or not, any school whose purpose and substantial func-
tion is to propagate a religious faith regardless of whether the church
owns it or not.
Because the teachers in these schools, like the teachers in Catholic
Bishops serve a dual purpose, both secular and religious, the Board deter-
mined that it would not exercise jurisdiction over those disputes stating it
will not review "the motive behind a school's conduct and the subjects
affecting teachers about which a school must bargain." The Board will
take a hands-off approach with schools that deal with religious issues or
teach religious precepts.
The Board believed the resolution of such disputes could lead to an
intrusion upon the religious freedom protected by the free exercise clause.
Thus, it is pretty clear that if the lay teachers are teaching religious mat-
ters, their employer will not be subject to the NLRA.
Now something you all may not know about the Catholic Bishops
2 283 N.L.R.B. 106 (1987).
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case is that Bishop McManus of Fort Wayne/South Bend was dealing
back in the late 1970's with a situation in which his teachers wanted, to a
great degree, to be organized by the union. Of course, this lawsuit like
most lawsuits took several years to get to the Supreme Court. So the
Bishop made a decision to bargain with the union anyway during the pen-
dency of the case. Again, I do not know how many people here have the
same situation, but in the Fort Wayne/South Bend Diocese the school
and the Bishop do in fact bargain with the lay teachers' union for.the
high schools. They do not bargain with any union for the teachers below
the high school level, however. Nevertheless, perhaps in an attempt to
appease the teachers or to respond to the pressures being placed on
Bishop McManus, right now the Fort Wayne/South Bend Diocese in fact
bargains with the lay teachers' union. His successor, Bishop D'Arcy, is
really in the same position that Bishop McManus was, in that he bargains
with them on a regular basis even though he is not required to do so. It
does make for some interesting bargaining times.
Last year in the Hanna Boys Center' case the National Labor Rela-
tions Board was petitioned to exercise jurisdiction over child care work-
ers, recreational assistants, cooks, cooks' helpers, maintenance employees,
plumbers, electricians, gardeners and custodians, all of whom were em-
ployed by a not-for-profit charitable institution founded by two priests to
serve as a residential facility for boys whose home environment was not
conducive to their educational needs.
In responding to the petition, the facility objected on the basis that
the jurisdiction should not be maintained because of the dual purpose
exemption. That is, these boys were receiving secular education as well as
religious education. While the Board found that the Center offered a wide
range of educational and religious training for the boys who lived at the
facility, it asserted jurisdiction over the petitioning child care workers
along with all the other employees because it found that the child care
workers were not truly involved in religious education. Instead of ac-
cepting the priest's characterization of these workers' responsibilities as
being akin to those of lay teachers in the parochial school system, the
Board likened the child care workers' non-secular duties to those of dor-
mitory monitors whose primary function was to supervise the boys as op-
posed to teaching them.
So from the most recent cases, it is pretty evident that the NLRB
will exercise jurisdiction over lay employees where those groups do not, in
fact, teach religious education. Whether any particular group is or is not
exempt from the NLRA is going to depend upon what you as the school
attorneys can establish as the primary function and goal of the group.
3 284 N.L.R.B. 121 (1987).
PERSONNEL ISSUES
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment based upon an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. There are certain exceptions to those proscriptions based on what is
called a bona fide seniority system and also a merit system set up with
objective standards as well as what is called a bona fide occupational
qualification. For our purpose I will limit the discussion to the religiously-
based employment decisions and the exceptions set forth in the law re-
lated to religion. Similar to the situation described in the Catholic Bish-
ops decision, to avoid the problem of forcing constitutional conflicts
based upon first amendment free exercise clause issues, Congress specifi-
cally excluded religious employers from liability under Title VII for em-
ployment decisions based on religious factors.
The constitutionality of this exemption was recently reexamined and
upheld by the Supreme Court in Corporation of Presiding Bishop v.
Amos." The case involved an employee of a religious affiliated non-profit
gymnasium who was discharged because it became apparent he had lost
his position of good standing in his church. Now, I am not sure how many
of you have read this Amos case in detail but what it amounted to was a
janitor who would not keep up his tithe with the Jesus Christ Latter Day
Saints. They found out about him not maintaining his tithe and they
fired him for it. From the statistics I have been able to read, if they did
that with the Catholic religion we would have very few employees, partic-
ularly in relation to other religions. At least that is what I read in the
news.
The way the Amos case came to the Supreme Court is interesting
and bears review because I think you, as attorneys for the Diocese, feel
that Amos grants this great religious exemption and Title VII does not
cover us. To destroy this misconception, I would like to walk through
with you what I understand to be the way this case got to the Supreme
Court and what the Supreme Court found.
Now, Amos started out in a federal district court. The district court
had determined that the religious employer's exemption under Section
702 of Title VII was unconstitutional. There really was not a question at
that point in time before the district court about whether the reason for
the discharge was the tithing or not. The question for the district court
was, is the religious exemption provision of Title VII constitutional or
not?
The court of appeals below upheld the district court and said that
the exemption allowed religious employers to discriminate on religious
grounds when making hiring and firing decisions related to non-religious
jobs. The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the constitutionality of the
" 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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congressional exemption granted to religious employers by deciding that
the exemption did not advance religion as applied to secular employees of
a religious employer, but rather, minimized governmental interference
with a religious employer's decision making process. For this reason the
Supreme Court held in Amos that a religious employer can make relig-
iously based employment decisions involving employees engaged in non-
profit secular activities without fear of reprisal under the guise of a Title
VII discrimination suit.
What this says is, if you, the diocese, can establish that this person
was fired because of a religious reason, you are entitled to the exemption.
But how do you get there? The Amos case was very simple. It was essen-
tially stipulated he was fired for not tithing. Now think about the reality
of firing an employee who performs only secular functions, like a janitor.
Are you going to come up with as the reason for the firing that this guy
did not give enough to the church so we fired him? No. The reason will
normally be, "He is not doing his job." So take a look at what the case
stands for and take a look at what the practical reality of Diocesan em-
ployees being fired within the diocese is. The opportunity for a pure reli-
gious reason to be the reason a secular working employee is fired is really
not that great.
It is nice to know that there is a religious exemption out there, but I
think realistically the opportunity for the Catholic Church to be able to
rely on such an exemption is not going to be that great in practice. I
would like to move past this and get into pure Title VII and age discrimi-
nation and talk about what your responsibilities are.
The Martin v. United Way of Erie County5 case provides clear evi-
dence that a religious or quasi-religious employer does not operate on a
plateau immune from federal scrutiny. Mary Martin was a part-time as-
sistant communications director for a charitable non-profit organization,
United Way. She was over forty years old which placed her within the
protection of the Age Discrimination and Employment Act. When her
employer advertised for an employee to fill a new full-time position, Mar-
tin submitted her application. She was never given an interview for the
position by the employer. She was later told that the advertised position
would not be filled due to a job restructuring. Not willing to leave well
enough alone however, Martin's boss also told her that she would not
have been considered for the position anyway because she did not possess
the young and pretty image required for the new opening. I can tell you
will be surprised at the result. To add insult to injury, the non-profit em-
ployer later hired two males-are we lucky enough to have the attorney
who defended the United Way here-who Martin claimed possessed in-
5 829 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1987).
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ferior skills to her own to fill two other new positions. When the employer
told Martin that there would be no full-time positions available to her,
she resigned. One week later the employer hired a slender young woman
to fill the full-time position for which Martin had originally applied.
Needless to say, Martin went to a lawyer and the result was that a suit
was filed.
After the district court granted the employer summary judgment, the
appellate court overturned and held that Martin had presented a cause of
action against her non-profit employer based upon both the Age Discrimi-
nation and Employment Act and Title VII. The court found that both the
ADEA and Title VII applied to non-profit charitable organizations pro-
vided that the requisite jurisdictional requirements were established.
Now if we have any employment lawyers out there you will know
what the jurisdictional requirements are, if you are in the United States
and doing business, you are probably covered. In all sincerity, whenever
we have had the opportunity to raise a jurisdictional argument, it just
never flies. You are either employing fifteen people or you're not. If you
have fifteen people employed, the court, the Board or the EEOC is going
to find some way to find that you are engaged in interstate commerce.
You are not going to get around it. Suffice it to say your church will, in all
probability, be covered by the Age Discrimination and Employment Act
as well as Title VII.
I would like to move on to the Fair Labor Standards Act. This is one
that is almost amusing, but I think it is a law that is going to have a
significant impact for churches in the future, a lot more impact than we
have right now. As most of you with private business or labor law experi-
ence are aware, the Fair Labor Standards Act generally requires that em-
ployers with business enterprises engaged in interstate commerce main-
tain certain employment records and pay their employees according to
certain minimum guidelines. In most situations, the Fair Labor Standards
Act requires the payment of a federally prescribed minimum wage which
currently is $3.35 per hour. I know Mr. Kennedy is interested in increas-
ing it, and I know there is a bill in Congress to increase it to $4.50 per
hour. In all likelihood we are going to have an increase in the minimum
wage. All employees paid on an hourly basis must receive pay equal to
"time and a half" for all time worked over forty hours in a week. A week
is defined as seven consecutive days.
Again, people who are not familiar with the FLSA may think that a
week is a week. Believe it or not that is not the case with the FLSA. Let
me give you an example. Say you have continuous operation where indi-
viduals work on what is called a rotating week. In other words, an indi-
vidual will work seven days straight and then have four days off and then
come back for six days work and then have two days off and then go back
on six. So in other words they will work Saturdays, Sundays, literally
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seven days straight.
Under the rules and regulations developed by the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, and the Department of Labor, there is a way that a person can
work seven straight days and not be entitled to overtime after 40 hours.
The Equal Pay Act comes within the Fair Labor Standards Act and
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex with regard to employees who
perform equal work under similar conditions. Again, you may all have
heard of the comparable work issue which, by and large to my knowledge,
is pretty well dead in the United States today. You may hear a lot about
it, and there may be a lot of practical problems raised, but by and large
the legal issue of comparable worth is not viable today. However, equal
pay for equal work certainly is and if you have two employees both of
whom are doing the same job and the female is paid less than the male,
you are going to have trouble defending that under the current law.
The Equal Pay Act makes exceptions for pay differentials based on
seniority systems, merit systems, production based systems, or other ob-
jectively measured bases as long as they are not sex-related. There are
also exemptions from the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act for certain employees including professional, administrative
and bona fide executive employees. I would like to briefly discuss with
you an outline of what these exemptions mean, particularly the executive
and administrative.
An employee may qualify as a bona fide business executive in one of
two ways. In the first instance the employee's primary duties must be
management related, meaning that among other things he or she must
have authority to hire and fire or to effectively recommend hiring and
firing and he must customarily and regularly exercise discretionary pow-
ers in the course of conducting his work while directing at least two peo-
ple. He or she cannot devote more than twenty percent of his time to
work not directly or closely related to managerial duties. An example that
comes to my mind immediately is restaurant supervisors. They may make
pizzas or prepare food twenty percent of the time, but if they have two
employees under them and their primary obligation is to manage, they
would be an executive employee exempt from the FLSA as long as they
made a minimum of $155 per week.
Another exemption, a second means for gaining the exemption for a
bona fide executive employee is what is called the highly salaried execu-
tive. While you may believe the first executive we talked about, by to-
day's standards, did not receive very high pay, a highly salaried executive
under the FLSA receives an equally unimpressive amount. An executive
receiving as little as $250 per week will qualify as a highly paid executive.
Now in order to qualify as a highly paid executive, in addition to the $250
a week that you have to receive, your basic primary obligation must be to
manage at least two people. However, here the amount of time which can
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be allocated to ministerial duties, for example making pizzas or preparing
food, is in the order of fifty percent.
That comes into play a lot when you have hands-on supervisors.
Again, going back to the Catholic Church, the issue can arise in many
different situations. Usually it arises for maintenance, electricians, essen-
tially supervisors over groundskeepers and that sort of thing. But you do
have the opportunity, at least from the legal perspective, of defending
your supervisory pay and not paying overtime after forty hours a week if
you pay the supervisor $250 or more a week.
Diocesan employees who perform their job duties strictly within the
religious office, meaning the chancery, the rectory, the convent, are gener-
ally exempt from the FLSA provisions of record keeping, minimum wage
and overtime pay since the work they do is not normally done for a com-
mon purpose relating to either money-making businesses of the church or
operations like schools. Maintenance people, child care workers, everyone
except teachers at a school come within the ambit of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act if you are otherwise covered by the Act.
The clerical, secretarial, janitorial and maintenance employees per-
forming work solely within the chancery, rectory or convent are not cov-
ered under the FLSA. Those same individuals, however, when they step
into a school to push a broom around, or to do maintenance, or secretarial
or clerical work, are covered. Now let me tell you how ridiculous that can
be. In Fort Wayne/South Bend a manager under the Bishop decided to
take the maintenance people from the chancery and once a week move
them over to the school. So one week they clean up the school, the next
week they clean up the chancery. The Department of Labor determined
that when they were cleaning up the chancery they were not eligible for
overtime, but when they were over at the school they were eligible for
overtime after forty hours. That is the way the Department of Labor
works. As ridiculous as that seems, that is the way they will interpret the
law, at least in Indiana.
Naturally, all volunteers, those who donate their time or perform
other services for the diocese without promise or expectation of payment
are also not covered under the FLSA.
Parochial, elementary and secondary school employees, unlike those
working at the chancery, are covered by the FLSA. Members of religious
orders, priests, nuns, brothers, are all exempt. Lay teachers who are certi-
fied and engaged in teaching are exempt even if they spend a considera-
ble amount of time engaged in coaching of athletics or acting as advisors
in various educational activities. However, unless a teacher makes at least
$250 per week, the teacher may lose exempt status if more than twenty
percent of his or her hours worked in any work week is spent doing non-
essential, non-teaching duties. Again, I do not know where you are from,
sometimes teachers are paid more than that, sometimes teachers are be-
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ing paid pretty close to that. It is just something for you to look at as you
review the employment practices of the diocese.
School administrative employees including superintendents, deans,
department heads or other administrators who use discretion and judg-
ment in matters of curriculum establishment and the maintaining of aca-
demic standard are exempt from the FLSA if they devote no more than
twenty percent of their hours to the ministerial activities I referred to
earlier. All other school employees essentially are covered under the
FLSA.
Outside of the school setting, any business enterprise or activity per-
formed for a common business purpose by a religious or a non-profit or-
ganization which otherwise meets the jurisdictional requirements of
FLSA is covered. Perhaps the best example of such a enterprise can be
found in the case of Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of
Labor6 decided by the Supreme Court in 1985. The Alamo Foundation
was a non-profit religious organization incorporated under the laws of
California for the purpose of ministering to the needy and performing
other charitable works. It derived the bulk of its income through a num-
ber of commercial businesses it operated ranging from service stations to
construction companies to hog farms. The Foundation's businesses were
staffed in a large part by its associates who were former drug addicts and
derelicts the Foundation had converted and rehabilitated. The associates
were given room and board and other non-cash benefits for their services.
When brought into court over its failure to comply with the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Foundation claimed, among other things, that as a
non-profit organization it was exempt from coverage and that its associ-
ates were not employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The Supreme Court denied the Foundation's position and held that
the FLSA's goal of assuring a minimum level of benefits for employees
engaged in the manufacture or flow of goods in interstate commerce ap-
plied to commercial activities of religious and not-for-profit organizations.
Regarding the Foundation's associates, the Supreme Court found them to
be employees under an economic reality test by noting they were depen-
dent upon the Foundation's support and must necessarily have expected
to receive some benefit in exchange for their services regardless of
whether the benefits were paid in cash or kind.
What the Alamo Foundation case teaches us is that even though a
diocese may be a non-profit tax exempt organization, the FLSA applies to
any enterprise it enters into that has a common business purpose which
places it in competition with for-profit enterprises.
If your diocese maintains such an enterprise or an elementary or sec-
6 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
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ondary school system, you should be aware of the FLSA and I caution
you to do just that. Check through the FLSA particularly for the record
keeping requirements that apply.
There is one last thing before I leave the FLSA that I think needs to
be said, and that is that complying with the FLSA is not an onerous bur-
den as a general rule. Likewise, paying equal pay for men and women to
perform the same work without differentiation based upon sex should
come as a matter of course, not as a burden. So I think from a moral
position a diocese ought to be complying with the FLSA.
I would now like to cover the AIDS discrimination issue. Of course, it
is important to stress the emergence of AIDS victims as a new class of
individuals protected under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. As you are
most probably aware this act requires that agencies or organizations that
receive federal funding not discriminate against handicapped individuals
who are otherwise capable of performing job-related duties. The Act's re-
quirements extends to non-profit religious organizations which receive
federal funding.
In the case of Chalk v. United States District Court of California7 a
complaint was maintained by a school teacher who was identified as hav-
ing AIDS. His school employer ordered him out of the classroom and into
a job function which would limit his contact with students. Because the
teacher felt he was otherwise qualified to continue performing his job, he
sought injunctive relief under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Although the district court noted the uncertainty surrounding the
possibility of the teacher infecting students with AIDS, it refused to en-
join the employer's reassignment decision. The appellate court reversed,
and ordered that the teacher be reinstated to his classroom duties pend-
ing a further hearing into whether the teacher's casual contact with his
students incident to his teaching duties in the classroom posed a signifi-
cant risk of harm to the students.
Religious employers faced with such a moral dilemma must be cogni-
zant, therefore, of the fact that the Rehabilitation Act's proscriptions may
apply to them if they maintain an agency or a program which is the recip-
ient of federal funds. The scope of the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act
has recently been enlarged by the passage of the Civil Right Restoration
Act which is another matter unto itself.
The final two topics I would like to cover in the outline are the Immi-
gration Act and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 dealing with health and wel-
fare and pension plans. The Immigration Act has been in effect since
1986; since its inception I have noticed many practical things that have
come to the forefront with the people I represent. Because this includes
7 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the diocese, these are things I think it is important for you to be aware of.
The first is that in all probability a lot of small companies do not comply
with it anyway. Employers with ten, twenty, or fifty employees simply
have neither the time nor the awareness to comply with the thing. They
do not know what they have to do despite everything that has been
printed in the papers.
You are all probably aware it is important to get the 1-9 form signed
by the new employee; that includes employees within your own law firm.
Let me give you an example how broad in scope this law is. Suppose one
of your clients hired his son to push a broom around his office part-time.
The son left to go to school in the fall and the Department of Labor, not
the Immigration people, came in and looked through the records. The
employer is more than happy to talk about how his son worked with him
and the Department of Labor guy says, "Where is your 1-9 form on your
son?" A $250 fine later will help the employer remember to get his son's
signature. I know that sounds ridiculous but let me tell you about the law.
You have to show the government investigator the 1-9 form. If you do not
have the 1-9 form, you will pay the price. If you think you are safe be-
cause you are a law firm, you are not.
I am telling you, get those 1-9 forms signed and make sure your dio-
cese gets those 1-9 forms signed. They have to be signed within three days
of hiring the employee. It is not a matter that six months ago you hired
somebody and now you are going to have them come in and sign, you are
at risk with these people if the forms are not signed within three days
after they have been hired.
Another practical pointer with respect to the Immigration Act is that
many employers feel that the best way to prove their case is when they
hire an employee, say bring your driver's license and bring your passport
and bring whatever evidence you have that complies with 1-9. We will
make a copy of it, stick it in your file and then when the Department of
Labor comes around, we will have the 1-9 and we will have copies of the
background information. Now that makes a lot of sense unless you make
a mistake. If you make a mistake and the investigator is going through
your records and he finds copies for everybody but ten employees, you are
dead as to those ten employees. The 1-9 form does not require you, and
the law does not require you to keep copies of the information that you
looked at to verify the 1-9 form. So you can look at their driver's license
and you can look at their passport, but that does not mean you have to
make copies of them.
What many employers do, particularly employers who go through a
large number of employees during the year, is not make copies of the
backup information. So when the Department of Labor comes in all they
have is the 1-9. If the investigator asks just say, yes, we have a procedure
with our personnel department and our procedure is that they have to
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show them the information or they do not sign. It is up to the diocese to
determine whether they want to make copies of those things and attach
them to the I-9s or not. I just want to suggest to you that some people
could end up getting in trouble because they only made copies of the in-
formation for some employees.
The Immigration Reform Act is a strict liability type statute. It does
not matter whether you have exercised good faith, it does not matter
whether you in fact know the person who is working for you is an Ameri-
can citizen. Knowledge is no defense. The only thing that is a defense is
to provide those 1-9 forms. Of course, the potential penalty can be signifi-
cant, anywhere from $250 to $2,000 for each 1-9 form that does not com-
ply with what the Department of Labor requires and the penalties get
stiffer.
My last topic concerns employee benefit plans maintained by the
church. While many of us are aware that employee benefit plans main-
tained by churches are exempt from requirements of the Employees Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), such plans must none-
theless qualify for favorable tax treatment under the Internal Revenue
Code if the employees benefiting from the plan are to enjoy favorable tax
treatment of their benefits. In its never ending zeal to close loopholes and
to maximize tax revenue, Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
One of the most troublesome provisions of that Act from both a legal and
business perspective is the new Section 89 which has been added to the
Internal Revenue Code. Although the new law passed over 18 months ago,
the IRS has yet to even issue proposed regulations on Section 89. Thus,
in this area employers including the church are going to have to venture
very cautiously.
Once Section 89 becomes effective, a health plan or a group term life
insurance plan must satisfy five requirements or all employees covered by
the plan will be taxed on the actual value of the benefits provided to the
employees. The five requirements are: (1) the plan has to be in writing;
(2) the employees' rights under the plan must be legally enforceable; (3)
the employees must be provided reasonable notification of the benefits
available in the plan; (4) the plan must be maintained for the exclusive
benefit of the employees; and (5) the employer must establish the plan
with the intention of maintaining it indefinitely.
These requirements should be explained more fully and possible
methods of compliance should be discussed in the long-awaited Treasury
Regulations to be issued under Section 89. Churches should be aware of
these requirements now, however, so that efforts may be commenced to
ensure compliance.
To let you know the significance of this law, if a benefit is not in
compliance, if your health insurance as of January 1 is not covered under
this plan, and your janitor has open heart surgery in February, March or
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April of 1989, the value of the cost for those health insurance benefits is
taxable.
Section 89 will also add new non-discrimination requirements with
respect to coverage of, and benefits for, highly compensated and non-
highly compensated employees. The requirements should not have a great
impact on the church health and life plans simply because it is unlikely
that the church would have employees who fall within the law's definition
of highly compensated. I have yet to meet a priest who makes $50,000 a
year, but that does not mean in future years they will not.
In conclusion, lay and clerical observers alike are generally aware of
the limitations which the first amendment places on government's ability
to regulate religion. In recent years, however, the line drawn by the first
amendment has become increasingly narrow. Society, the legislative
branch, the executive branch and the judiciary, have suddenly and perva-
sively encroached upon religious institutions. In the field of employment
law in particular, the church cannot ignore the many obligations imposed
upon it by federal law.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
JOE DiVITO, DIOCESE OF ST. PETERSBURG: On the Title VII
exemptions, we have had situations where the janitor, the housekeeper,
the priest or someone else gets fired, puts down employer St. Mary's
Church. The department does its thing, sends the forms out and one of
the first questions is, "Do you have fifteen or more employees?" The an-
swer is, "No." How safe are we in relying on the definition of employee as
being the parish versus the diocese? Do we look at the parish who writes
the checks or the diocese who is the real employer?
MR. HOPKINS: I think very simply, whoever writes the checks.
JOE DiVITO, DIOCESE OF ST. PETERSBURG: Even if it is not
an entity. I think in those cases where you are separately incorporated it
is probably very easy, you are safe. But in a diocese that does not have
separate corporations, the parish is a non-entity.
MR. HOPKINS: It would be similar to a division in a corporation. I
do not see any problem with that at all.
BERNIE HUGER, ARCHDIOCESE OF ST. LOUIS: Is there any
church plan exemption with respect to Section 89?
MR. HOPKINS: No. The church exemption deals with ERISA and it
is very clear that church plans are not covered under ERISA.
BERNIE HUGER, ARCHDIOCESE OF ST. LOUIS: But on the CO-
BRA requirements-there is an exemption on that?
PERSONNEL ISSUES
MR. HOPKINS: COBRA is not covered. COBRA is part of ERISA,
the church does not have to comply with COBRA. What we are talking
about is the tax exempt status of a benefit received by the employee. The
church is exempt from ERISA and COBRA. The church, as a non-profit
organization, is tax exempt. What we are talking about is whether the
employee who receives the benefit is going to be taxed on the value of the
benefit or not. It is an employee thing. That is why Section 89 does apply,
no question about it. If the church does not do it right the employee is
going to get hit. It can have a devastating impact on the employees.
GINO MARCHETTI, DIOCESE OF NASHVILLE: On the fifteen
employees, one problem we ran into and maybe as a footnote, Title VII as
I understand it gives the minimum limits for protecting employee rights
but individual states may enact, and in fact have legislation which
reduces that jurisdictional coverage. In Tennessee we only require eight
individuals to be covered by the state acts and I think some get down to
even two employees.
MR. HOPKINS: I think that realistically employees today enjoy
more coverage under state laws than federal. Where are the California
lawyers? They are probably crying right now. You get hit for punitive
damages. You know AIDS in San Francisco-the San Francisco law on
AIDS is that if you do not hire somebody because of AIDS, he can re-
cover punitive damages, triple damages, attorney's fees and emotional
distress under a San Francisco ordinance. Talk about punitive, they want
to make sure people do not use AIDS as a basis for employment
decisions.
JOEL BLASS, DIOCESE OF BILOXI: I am suffering from emo-
tional distress right now by not having the benefit of the exemption
under ERISA for a church plan. I have been using that and I hope you
tell me that I am not totally wrong.
MR. HOPKINS: You have the consolation of religion and the solace
of friends and that is it. You do not enjoy the exemption. What I am
saying is-how is the church going to have income? It is going to become
more commercial. You have to seek ways to bring money in so you can
improve the schools. The only way you can do that is to become more
commercial. The churches are going to have to act like private employees
more and more, of necessity. If I leave you with nothing else, the point I
want to make is that they ought to try to comply with these laws now
because in five years, ten years they will have to anyway. It is easier to get
used to a routine of complying with the laws than to make a massive
change later. There is nothing worse to an employer who has the best
secretary in the world and who has been paying her a salary that would
knock your eyes out, for the Department of Labor to come in and say,
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"Hey, she is not exempt, you owe her time and a half for the last two
years."
If it was an onerous requirement, if it was something that was diffi-
cult for the church to comply with, then you have to look at alternatives.
You have to look at legislation, you have to look at ways to avoid the
potential pitfalls. What we are talking about are minimums, minimum
wage, overtime after forty hours, those sorts of things-things that mor-
ally should not be objectionable by any diocese. I think the church should
be leading the way in these matters.
